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INTRODUCTION
Being a good mother is difficult. Being a good mother and a victim' of
domestic violence2 is even harder. The different and often competing
expectations placed on battered mothers in the juvenile (child welfare),3
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her incredible patience, diligent editing, and perpetualsupport.
1. For consistency, I refer to persons subjected to domestic violence as "victims."
There are other terms I could have used, including "survivor," "battered woman," etc. I
am not convinced that any term is completely adequate.
2. The term "domestic violence" is also problematic as abuse can take many
different forms, including emotional, financial, and sexual.
3. When I refer to child welfare proceedings, I refer to the proceedings against
parents by the state child welfare agency. In many states, these proceedings occur in
the state juvenile court. In other states, however, these same proceedings occur within
the family court, or low-level trial court system. For this Article, I use the termjuvenile court to describe the court where the child welfare proceedings take place.
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civil/trial,4 criminal, and family' court systems present a profound and
befuddling problem. In this Article, I intend to identify the difficulty and
uniqueness of being both a mother6 and a victim of domestic violence,
investigate the tension and conflict among different judicial systems, and
proffer some suggestions for reform.
Battered mothers often find themselves caught between the competing
demands of the juvenile, civil, criminal and family court systems. In some
states, jurisdiction may be concurrently vested in more than one court-
generally, family and district, or district and juvenile. In other states, all
courts are independent. And in other states, child welfare proceedings are
heard in family court. Regardless of the details, in each state there are
several court systems that affect battered mothers. Mothers who are
concurrently involved in multiple court systems inevitably experience the
differing expectations placed on them by different courts. "Failure to
protect" laws are "child-centered," whereas domestic violence laws tend to
be "victim-centered." While the intent behind each set of laws is
protection, there may be imperfections in the way the laws were drafted
and are applied.
Battered mothers are charged with abuse and neglect in the juvenile
court at alarmingly high rates. Many states prosecute exposure to intimate
partner violence as a type of child maltreatment, or "failure to protect."8
Other states prosecute the same charge as a criminal charge in district court
or another equivalent lower-level court. Charges are frequently brought
against the victim of violence, often the mother and custodial parent, for
failing to protect her children from the domestic abuse. In many cases,
social workers and the courts place unrealistic expectations on a woman by
requiring her to either obtain a protection order preventing contact with her
abuser or to make a complete and immediate separation from her abuser.
These expectations are potentially impossible for battered mothers to
achieve because battered mothers are typically financially dependent on
their abusers and lack a community support system. Such financial and
4. In this Article, I refer to the trial court as the lowest level of civil court in a
given jurisdiction where a victim can seek a civil protection order.
5. In this Article, I refer to the family court as the court that hears cases involving
custody and visitation. In some states, however, these same proceedings occur in
probate court or a low-level trial court.
6. In the sections where I talk exclusively about mothers who are victims of
domestic violence, I use the term "battered mothers." Again, this terminology is not
entirely satisfactory.
7. See Jeanne Fugate, Who's Failing Whom? A Critical Look at Failure to Protect
Laws, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 272, 273 (2001).
8. See, e.g., NAT'L CLEARINGHOUSE ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT INFO.,
CHILDREN AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: SUMMARY OF STATE LAwS (2004),
http://www.unified-solutions.org/Pubs/children and dv summary of state laws.pdf
(outlining the applicable laws of Maine, Montana, Pennsylvania, aid West Virginia).
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support issues are a common effect of a relationship built on control and
isolation. These expectations are dangerous and could have lasting and
counterintuitive results.
Further, once the battered woman leaves her abuser or obtains a civil
protection order9 against the abuser, the abuser is likely to file a family
court case for visitation and/or custody. If the abuser is able to obtain such
an order, he will be authorized by the court to have contact with his victim
through their children, defeating any of her attempts to meet the
expectations of the juvenile court. In general, family courts do not take the
step of preventing any and all visitation by one of a child's parents.10
While current custody laws across the United States do take into account
how domestic violence plays into shared orders of custody, very little is
made explicit about contact and visitation." Family courts are concerned
about alienating one parent from the children and often give parents many
chances to stay involved in their children's lives.12 Thus, women who do
everything asked of them by child protective services-that is to say,
complete separation from their abusers-may then face opposing pressures
and judgments in the family court.
Battered mothers who seek civil protection orders in the district court
face expectations that are sometimes directly in conflict with those imposed
both by the juvenile court in abuse and neglect proceedings and by the
family court in custody matters. Battered mothers in civil protection order
proceedings may obtain temporary custody of their children on an ex-parte
basis. While there is a hierarchy in the relative power of the different
judicial systems-thus an order from the family court supersedes an order
from juvenile or district court-the conflicts in the expectations,
possibilities, and messages conveyed by the three types of courts are
profound. For example, an order from a juvenile court could very possibly
require a mother to isolate herself and her children completely from a
batterer, while at the same time a family court orders her to facilitate
visitation between that abuser and her children. This can occur even when
a district court concurrently grants a mother full custody of the children. In
9. Civil protection orders are also known as "restraining orders," "orders of
protection," "civil protection orders," or "protective orders."
10. See, e.g., Mass. Law Reform Inst., Child Custody and Visitation,
MASSLEGALHELP, http://www.masslegalhelp.org/children-and-families/child-custody-
and-visitation (last visited Feb. 9, 2012) (outlining the possible non-court-imposed
solutions to comply with visitation orders, while concurrently protecting the safety of
the children and abused parent).
11. See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-5-24 (West 2003) (granting courts a wide
array of options in tailoring visitation orders to situations in which domestic violence
has occurred).
12. See, e.g., TEx. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 501.099 (West 2009) (instructing the
Department of Corrections to pursue policies that "encourage family unity").
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addition, the district court may include a no-contact requirement between
the mother and abuser, which will then be subsequently amended various
times in different courts.
Are there ways to reform a system that results in this seemingly
impossible and incoherent scenario? Why do these conflicts exist? What
normative conflicts underlie the problem? In this Article, I seek to make
concrete recommendations as well as proffer ideas for systemic change; for
example, the attorneys appointed to represent battered mothers in juvenile
court should be attorneys with specific experience and training in domestic
violence and in different judicial venues within the same state. I then
analyze the feasibility of coordination among the different court systems
and whether and how information can be shared without violating
confidentiality.
VIGNETTE 1
In 2008, I represented a woman in the Massachusetts Probate and Family
Court. She was living in a shelter with her infant daughter, and a year-long
restraining order from the Massachusetts District Court was in effect
against her ex-boyfriend (hereinafter "the respondent"), the father of her
child. The respondent hired private counsel and filed a petition for full
custody in probate court. I opposed the motion in writing and was prepared
to argue vigorously against any such request. At the time the motion was
filed, an open criminal investigation was proceeding against the respondent
for potential sexual assault against the child, and the Department of
Children and Families had issued a supported finding of abuse by the father
against the child. There was no such finding against my client as she had
cooperated fully with the Department of Children and Families by seeking
and obtaining both safe shelter and a restraining order. I successfully
opposed that first motion in court. The respondent, however, would not
back down. His attorney proceeded to make a series of requests and
motions to the court, including a request for an appointment of a Guardian
ad Litem to evaluate the situation, a request for discovery, and an appeal to
the Department of Children and Families to re-evaluate their initial finding
against the respondent. In the meantime, the Department of Children and
Families closed the case, as my client had effectively achieved the goal of
safety; she was in housing, a restraining order was in place at the time, and
the respondent did not have any visitation rights.
The respondent's persistence worked. The next time we were in court,
he was granted supervised visitation. The supervised visits eventually
became unsupervised visits with drop offs and pickups at a local police
station. The court appointed a Guardian ad Litem to do an evaluation of
the case and parties. The Guardian had no experience in domestic
800
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violence. She gave very little credit or space in her report to the reasons
why my client opposed visitation by the respondent, my client's efforts on
behalf of her child, or her willingness to work with all agencies and
evaluators appointed to the case. The Guardian's final report was turned in
the morning of our hearing, during which the respondent requested
overnight visits. The report barely mentioned the respondent's abuse of my
client and failed to credit the finding by the Massachusetts Department of
Children and Families of abuse against the child.
I opposed the report being admitted into evidence based on the fact that I
had not had time to properly review the materials. My request was denied
and the judge ordered us to immediately begin our oral arguments for and
against overnight visitation. I believe I began as follows: "Your honor,
Margo Lindauer, staff attorney at a certain domestic violence agency in
Boston on behalf of Ms. X. As you are aware from previous hearings, my
client is a victim of domestic violence by the respondent and the
request . . ." Before I could continue speaking, the judge bellowed:
"Counsel, if I hear you say the words 'domestic violence' one more time in
my court room, I will throw you out."
How was I to continue my argument as to why forced interaction
between the two parties to facilitate overnight visits would not only require
verbal and physical contact with her abuser, but would also be in direct
violation of a restraining order already in place, and would endanger my
client's daughter? "Domestic violence" was at the heart of the proceeding.
Furthermore, it was our contention-with the support of the Department of
Children and Families-that the respondent, like many abusers, had also
abused the child.
This snapshot into a moment of litigation highlights the litany of issues
and conflicts that are not resolved in our present system. How could a
woman who did everything asked of her by child protective services be
deprived of her voice in a family court? In the instant case, she fled her
home in the middle of the night with her baby and went into a shelter in a
city that she did not know and where she did not speak the language. She
engaged with the social worker appointed to her case, worked with the
district attorney, immediately applied for both temporary and year-long
restraining orders, engaged with our legal team, and cooperated with the
Guardian ad Litem appointed to her family court case. How could she lose
in the end? How could a court not want to hear about the domestic
violence? How could we reopen the abuse and neglect case? How could
there be such overt contradictions among the findings of three courts within
the same jurisdiction? How could three courts focused on the same family
say things directly in conflict? How could my client be the ideal parent in
an abuse and neglect proceeding but be perceived as obstinate and
alienating in a probate court matter? How could one court find that the
2012] 801
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abuse alleged in her restraining order petition be so severe that there was no
question but to issue a year-long restraining order preventing any
interaction, but another court roll its eyes when the aforementioned abuse
was brought up? How could this happen?
VIGNETTE 2
Imagine you are a young mother sharing a home with your partner and
your two young children, ages 1 and 3. Imagine now that your mother, a
middle-aged woman, has had a lifelong struggle with substance abuse and
has just been released from a court-mandated inpatient treatment center
after being charged with drug possession. Your mother had nowhere to go
upon her release and you allowed her to move into your home on a
temporary basis while she got back on her feet. You did not give her a key,
however, and she was unable to be in the home unless you or your partner
was there to supervise. Imagine now that you suspect that your mother is
using again as her behavior has become increasingly erratic and she is
easily angered.
One day, your mother knocks on the door and your partner is allegedly
slow to answer as she has been awoken from a nap. Your mother is
incensed by the time she enters the home and starts screaming at your
partner (you are not home). She is so mad that she takes a broom, breaks it
in half, and swings it at your partner's face, narrowly missing. You partner
is so frightened by the incident that she grabs the two children who are
asleep in their room and runs outside to hide in her aunt's car while the
police are called. The police arrive but your mother has fled the scene.
The police take a report and you later return from work to hear about the
drama that has ensued. The next day, you receive a call from Child
Protective Services who want to speak with you and visit your home. You
are scared of what happened, scared of what your mother could do to your
partner, scared of where your mother is and what she is doing and scared
that you may lose your children. What do you do?
THREE SYSTEMS THAT AFFECT BATTERED MOTHERS
Mothers are affected by intimate partner violence at much higher rates
than fathers. 13 While some argue that the tension battered mothers face is
not gendered, the research proves that it is. 14 The controversy related to
13. Michael P. Johnson & Janel M. Leone, The Differential Effects of Intimate
Terrorism and Situational Couple Violence: Findings from the National Violence
Against Women Survey, 26 PENN ST. J. FAM. IssuEs 322 (2005).
14. See NAT'L NETWORK TO END DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, INTIMATE PARTNER
VIOLENCE AND GENDER, http://www.ncdsv.org/images/
Intimate%2OPartner%2OViolence%20and%2OGender.pdf (last visited May 30, 2012).
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"gender symmetry" and whether women perpetrate violence against their
male partners as frequently as men do has largely been put to rest by the
research of M.P. Johnson. As shown by Johnson and others, the gender
symmetry debate can be resolved by distinguishing between intimate
terrorism and situational couple violence." In intimate terrorist
relationships, the perpetrator engages in an intentional pattern of coercion
and control over his partner in areas such as finances, social contacts,
intimacy, employment, and parenting practices, and uses violence as one
means to that end. "Nonviolent control tactics become violent through
their implicit connection with potential physical harm."1 6 Research reveals
far higher rates of male perpetrated intimate partner terrorism on their
female partners than female on male.' 7  Thus, mothers are much more
likely to be the victims of intimate terrorism than fathers.
Further, research suggests that there are many ways mothering and
parenting decisions can be the focus of a batterer's treatment of his
victim.18 In fact, in many cases, the most basic and fundamental decision
to become, or not become, a mother has been controlled by men. 9 A
batterer can exert control over his victim by attacking the mother-child
relationship in any of a variety of ways, from directly attacking the child to
making the victim incapable of fulfilling her duties as a caregiver by, for
example, withholding financial resources. In this way, men's violence has
a "double level of intentionality," in that attacks on a child can, in effect, be
attacks on the mother.20 What Johnson coins "intimate partner terrorism" is
exactly the type of intimate partner violence that leads battered mothers to
be exposed to the court system: "a planned pattern of coercive control that
may involve physical, sexual or psychological abuse rising to the level of
torture as understood in human rights discourse."
Situational couple violence, on the other hand, is violence that is not
connected to patterns of control and coercion.22 Situational couple violence
stems from specific arguments that in some instances escalate to violence,
but show no relationship-wide evidence or connection to controlling one's
15. See Johnson & Leone, supra note 13, at 323.
16. See id. at 324.
17. See id at 323.
18. See Simon Lapierre, More Responsibilities, Less Control: Understanding the
Challenges and Difficulties Involved in Mothering in the Context ofDomestic Violence,
40 BRIT. J. Soc. WORK 1434, 1436-37, 1440, 1442 (2009).
19. See id.
20. Lapierre, supra note 18, at 1446.
21. Sarah M. Buel, Effective Assistance of Counsel for Battered Women
Defendants: A Normative Construct, 26 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 217, 218 (2003)
[hereinafter Buel, Effective Assistance of Counsel].
22. See Johnson & Leone, supra note 13, at 324.
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partner.2 3 Studies show fairly equal rates of male on female and female on
male situational violence.24
In addition to suffering from actual violence and dealing with the effects
of the abuse on their children, battered mothers have limited access to legal
resolutions for these harms.
[P]artly because [the harms suffered by women in this culture] are
different [from those suffered by men], they often do not 'trigger' legal
relief in the way that harms felt by men alone or by men and women
equally do. As a result women are doubly injured: first by the harm-
causing event itself, and second by the peculiarity or nonexistence of the
law's response to those harms. 25
Battered mothers are charged with abuse and neglect at alarmingly high
rates.26 Abuse and neglect are civil child maltreatment charges that are
27broadly interpreted in the juvenile court. Some states hear their abuse and
neglect cases in probate or family court. 2 8  "Failure to protect" is an
allegation used in neglect proceedings against parents who fail to "protect"
their child or children from some named harm. The harm in question is not
a static concept, however. The ways in which the "failure to protect"
doctrine is construed, applied, and worded varies state to state. 29 Failing to
provide recommended medical care, for instance, can be considered a form
of neglect in certain states.
Other forms of neglect include but are not limited to: physical neglect,
emotional neglect, inadequate supervision, environmental neglect, and
educational neglect. 30 Failing to protect your child from child abuse is
another type of harm often included in an allegation.31 States define
"failing to protect" differently, but language like "negligence,"
"endangerment," "abandonment," and "condoning of abuse" are common
terminology that run throughout the statutes.32
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE 96 (1997).
26. See Fugate, supra note 7, at 273.
27. See Chris Gottlieb, Reflections on Judging Mothering, 39 U. BALT. L. REV.
371, 378 (2010) (claiming that these actors often require parents to meet subjective
standards seemingly impossible to meet in many instances).
28. See, e.g., Divisions of Superior Court, STATE OF CONNECTICUT JUDICIAL
BRANCH, http://www.jud.ct.gov/external/super/divisions.htm (last visited May 30,
2012); New York City Courts, NEW YORK STATE UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM,
http://www.nycourts.gov/courts/nyc/index.shtml (last updated Aug. 2, 2006).
29. See, e.g., DIANE DEPANFILIS, CHILD NEGLECT: A GUIDE FOR PREVENTION,
ASSESSMENT AND INTERVENTION 45 (2006), http://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/
usermanuals/neglect/neglect.pdf.
30. See id. at 12-14.
31. See id. at 45.
32. See id at 12.
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Civil child maltreatment statutes "trigger child protective services
investigation and intervention, and the potential involvement of juvenile
court" or its equivalent. 3 The primary goals when conducting such
interventions are "remediation of parental or family problems identified as
causing the maltreatment, preservation of the family unit when possible,
and planning for the long-term safety and stability of the child."3 1
However, a sustained abuse and neglect charge can result in the removal of
the child and persistent involvement with the juvenile court and child
protective services. Child abuse and neglect allegations that lead to a
child's removal include reference to spousal abuse in approximately one
third of cases.35
Many states use exposure to intimate partner violence as a type of
neglect charge,36 called "failure to protect."37 Charges are brought against
the victim of violence, often the mother and custodial parent, for failing to
protect her children from the domestic abuse. In essence, the allegation
charges the mother, who is also the victim of violence, for not preventing
the violence or for "allowing" their child to be exposed to it.39
It is undisputed that the implementation of policies related to neglect and
abuse disproportionally affects mothers.40  Criminal prosecution based
upon failure-to-protect statutes, in particular, may carry the greatest
potential for unfairly punishing mothers. "Most statutes fail to take into
account the context within which a mother exercises her caretaking
responsibilities. Mothers tried under these statutes are convicted if their
attempts to protect their children are ineffective, or if fear for their safety or
their children's safety effectively prevents intervention." 41 In addition,
studies confirm that the caretaking parent is more likely to be reported for
child abuse.42 Mothers are more often than not the primary custodians of
their children. Therefore, they tend to be the focus of and the named party
33. Lois A. Weithorn, Protecting Children from Exposure to Domestic Violence:
The Use and Abuse of Child Maltreatment, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 20 (2001).
34. Id.
35. See Thomas D. Lyon, Are Battered Women Bad Mothers? Rethinking the
Termination ofAbused Women's Parental Rights for Failure to Protect, in NEGLECTED
CHILDREN: RESEARCH, PRACTICE, AND POLICY 237, 238 (Howard Dubowitz ed., 1999).
36. See Weithorn, supra note 33, at 19.
37. Id. at 29 n.107.
38. Id. at 32-33.
39. Fugate, supra note 7, at 294 n.98.
40. See, e.g., Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of Motherhood: Conflicting
Definitions from Welfare "Reform, " Family and Criminal Law, 83 CORNELL L. REV.
688, 718 (1998) (outlining the disproportionate prevalence of abuse claims against
parents raising the children as opposed to the non-caretaking parent).
41. Id. at 720.
42. See id. at 718.
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in neglect proceedings.43
While mothers tend to be charged with neglect at higher rates and are
"blamed" in the juvenile court, fathers in many instances remain immune
from accountability." Fathers, if paternity is established and/or their
identities are known, are often named parties in neglect proceedings.
However, these fathers rarely appear in court for the proceedings.45
Despite being named parties, fathers' lack of involvement in their
children's lives immunizes them from civil prosecution for neglect. 46 If
fathers fail to appear at court and the government proceeds with a case for
neglect, the case in chief becomes solely about the mother and her failings.
Some have suggested that juvenile court be renamed "mother's court,"
"because of the absence of fathers from child welfare proceedings." 7
Obtaining a restraining order is a judicial remedy offered to aid victims
of domestic violence. Most states make the process pro-se friendly so that
victims can access the system immediately without the help of an attorney.
Frequently, child protective service workers tell mothers that they must
obtain a restraining order or expose themselves to "failure to protect"
charges.48 In other instances, district attorneys tell mothers who are victims
of violent offenses that they must testify against their batterer in order to
obtain subsidized or public housing.49 These requirements are problematic
on many levels.
The procedure by which victims can access the judicial system and apply
for an order varies state to state, but many states operate under a two-step
process by which a victim applies for an order at a temporary or ex-parte
phase: 1) a respondent (defendant) is served with the order, and 2) there is
another hearing scheduled (usually 10-14 days out), where, if the victim
can prove that she and the respondent meet the jurisdictional and
relationship requirements, and that the alleged offense meets the state
standard for intra-family violence, a judge will grant the order.50 Each state
determines the relief available to a victim in the restraining order, but there
43. See id
44. See id. at 694, 715.
45. See id at 709.
46. Id. at 710.
47. See id. at 709.
48. See Nancy K.D. Lemon, The Legal System's Response to Children Exposed to
Domestic Violence, 9 DOMESTIC VIOLENCE & CHILD. 67, 71 (1999) (noting that charges
may be brought even when there is no physical harm by the mother or batterer).
49. Victim of Domestic Violence Priority - Documentation Requirements,
NYC.Gov, http://www.nyc.gov/html/nycha/downloads/pdf/vdv-documentation.pdf.
50. STOP ABUSIVE AND VIOLENT ENVIRONMENTS, THE USE AND ABUSE OF
DOMEsTIc RESTRAINING ORDERS (2011), available at http://www.saveservices.org/
downloads/VAWA-Restraining-Orders.
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are consistencies across state lines; typical language involves a stay away
provision that inhibits contact, abuse, and assault.5' Some states allow
victims to seek civil remedies including vacate orders, temporary orders of
child custody, and child support.5 2
Battered mothers who seek civil protection orders in the district court
face expectations that are different and apart from those imposed by the
juvenile court in abuse and neglect proceedings and by the family court in
custody matters. While there is a hierarchy in the relative power of the
different judicial systems-an order from the family court supersedes an
order from juvenile or district court-the differing expectations,
possibilities, and messages conveyed are profound. In the case described
above, where a mother seeks custody in the district court through a
protection order, a respondent or father can then go to family court and
petition for custody and visitation. The resulting order from family court
will supersede the protection order as related to custody visitation and
financial support of the minor children.
Family courts operate under different models than juvenile courts and
district courts. Juvenile courts hearing child welfare cases focus solely on
the best interests of the children, while district courts hearing protection
order cases focus on violence prevention.53 Family law, in contrast, is
premised on the family and the ideal construction thereof. The
presumption is of an arrangement that is almost non-existent today: a
mother at home with minor children and a father working outside the
home.5 4 Family courts are based on family preservation and equality.
While it is clear that the above model does not describe most of the
population utilizing family courts, antiquated notions and the idea of
"equality" pervade. Family courts operate under a presumption of shared
responsibility and family unity. A presumption of shared legal custody
exists in family courts. In other words, courts assume that parents should
share parenting responsibilities without a specific finding to the contrary.56
51. Jane Aiken & Katherine Goldwasser, The Perils of Empowerment, 20
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 139, 146 (2010).
52. See id. at 147.
53. Compare, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-21 (West 2011) (noting that the
purpose of the juvenile system is "to provide for the care, protection, and wholesome
mental and physical development of juveniles coming within the provisions of this
act"), with N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-18 (West 2011) (declaring that the legislature's
goal in enacting domestic violence legislation was "to assure the victims of domestic
violence the maximum protection from abuse the law can provide").
54. See Murphy, supra note 40, at 688, 690.
55. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 902 (West 2011) (declaring in the
statement of purpose that "preservation of the family as a unit [is] fundamental" and
that the court will endeavor to provide control, care, and treatment for each person
under its jurisdiction).
56. See Joan S. Meier, A Historical Perspective On Parental Alienation Syndrome
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Studies confirm that the number of pro se family law litigants continues
to increase every year." Some studies report that nearly eighty percent of
family law litigants that technically qualify as indigent and thus eligible for
free legal assistance cannot obtain it.58  Organizations that provide free
legal services have suffered tremendously in the recent economic
downturn. The Legal Services Corporation ("LSC") is the "single largest
funder of civil legal aid for low-income Americans in the nation." 59 LSC-
funded programs anticipate losing 1,226 full-time personnel between 2011
and 2012.60 Low-income clients who are unable to afford counsel and
unable to obtain civil legal services therefore appear in court without
representation.61 Further, pro se litigants may be confused about what legal
posture to take in custody and visitation matters because of their previous
experiences with the juvenile court and/or the district court.
Batterers can use the family court system to publicly humiliate their
victims and undermine their victim's parenting skills. 6 2  This public
humiliation is another way batterers try to control their victims. "Many
mothers view losing custody-especially to their abuser-as the worst
thing that could happen to them." 63 When abusers win a custody petition,
"they have thereby succeeded in inflicting a profound injury on the
mother."64 In the instant case, the injury is no longer physical, but it
continues to be profoundly hurtful.
Fathers who file retributive custody and visitation petitions in family
court often claim "parental alienation syndrome" and "parental alienation"
with increasing frequency. Parental alienation syndrome (hereinafter
referred to as PAS) is a syndrome based solely on one psychologist's, Dr.
Richard Gardner's, analysis of his own clinical experience. 6 5 He described
PAS as a syndrome "whereby vengeful mothers" use child abuse
allegations to punish their ex-partners and in turn ensure that their exes do
And Parent Alienation, 6 J. CHILD CUSTODY 232, 244 (2009).
57. See, e.g., Self-Representation Pro Se Statistics, NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS
(Sept. 26, 2006), http://www.ncsconline.org/wc/publications/memos/
prosestatsmemo.htm.
58. See, e.g., JANE C. MuRPHY & ROBERT RUBINSON, FAMILY MEDIATION: THEORY
AND PRACTICE 161 (2009).
59. What is LSC?, LSC.Gov, http://www.Isc.gov/about/what-is-lsc (last visited
April 20, 2012).
60. Staff Reductions Hit Legal Aid Programs, LSC.GOV,
http://www.1sc.gov/media/press-releases/staff-reductions-hit-legal-aid-programs (last
visited April 20, 2012).
61. See id.
62. See Meier, supra note 56, at 234.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See id. at 235.
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not receive custody.6 6 Gardner's PAS is not an actual syndrome as it is not
based on any scientific evidence or any empirical data, but rather is based
on Gardner's own beliefs about relationships and sexuality. 67
A more recent development, "parental alienation," is a revised approach
to PAS. 8 Parental alienation is not specifically directed at fathers who
have allegedly been alienated from their children by "vengeful mothers."
Parental alienation asserts that children can become alienated and estranged
for many different reasons, not just mothers who have it out for the father
of their children.6 9 That being said, the differences between "PAS" and
"parental alienation" are subtle and not clearly established.70 It is clear that
parental alienation still "necessarily draw[s] on PAS theory and
scholarship." 7  The "father's rights movement" has taken on PAS and
parental alienation as its own, and done an effective job-through
advocacy, media campaigns, and publications-promoting these theories to
the public and the court.72
For a victim of domestic violence, this means that judges tend to be
receptive to fathers' pleas to be involved and are not inclined to give
victims of violence sole legal custody without a specific finding of family
violence.73 To obtain such a finding, however, mothers must either obtain
a civil protection order such that a judge acknowledges the violence, or
testify to the violence on record and have the judge make a finding of
credibility. 74  Judges see many mothers seeking child support against
"dead-beat dads." In other words, judges may grow accustomed to seeing
fathers who are not involved. Seeing fathers who actively engage in the
legal process so as to be a part of their children's lives may impress certain
judges.
Asserting independence and acknowledging violence in a public forum
may put battered mothers in even more danger.75  Battered mothers are
often left with a choice between two evils: accepting shared legal custody
with their batterers, which requires communication; or, talking about the
66. Id.
67. See id. at 236.
68. See id. at 246.
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. Id.
72. See id. at 244.
73. See id. at 244-45.
74. See, e.g., Clements v. Haskovec, 251 S.W.3d 79, 83 (Tex. App. 2008) (making
a finding of family violence after hearing testimony and holding that previous actions
met the statutory definition and that violence may occur in the future).
75. See, e.g., State v. Mechling, 633 S.E.2d 311, 324 (W.Va. 2006) (calling the fear
of retaliation by the defendant a "reasonable projection of past conduct").
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abuse in a public forum, which puts them at risk of retributive violence
from their batterers. Stripping parents of all visitation rights is extremely
uncommon. Except in the rare cases where a judge makes specific findings
that visitation will likely hurt the child's physical and or mental/emotional
health and/or impede on the child's emotional development will the court
prevent any and all visitation from occurring. A judge may decide to
prevent visitation in a case where there is a finding or pending investigation
of sexual assault on the child in question by the parent in question. Family
courts are very hesitant to prohibit any contact between children and their
biological parents.
Allowing visitation, even if it is supervised or facilitated by a neutral
third party, requires communication between victim and batterer.n There
is involvement through the child, control through court orders, and
continued involvement until the family court order expires, either at the
child's eighteenth birthday or when the child turns twenty-one (depending
on the state).
"FAILURE TO PROTECT" AS A PROBLEMATIC DOCTRINE
"Failure to protect" laws that allow for intervention by the juvenile court
based on exposure to domestic violence assume intimate partner violence
harms children. 8  This assumption often necessitates state or judicial
intervention on behalf of the children. There are many examples in which
"failure to protect" allegations are applied correctly, where removal is the
judgment that best serves the child's interests. 79 That said, definitive data
does not exist on whether and when removal is in fact more detrimental to
a child's interests than continued exposure to intimate partner violence.so
In the past twenty years, much research has been completed and data
compiled about the negative impacts of exposure to domestic violence on
children's psychological and physical well-being.8' "Exposed children
may develop a range of social, emotional, and academic problems
including aggressive conduct, anxiety symptoms, emotional withdrawal,
76. Cf MODEL CODE ON DOMESTIC & FAMILY VIOLENCE § 402 cmt. (Nat'l Council
of Juv. & Fam. Ct. Judges 1994) (noting that the drafters of the model code chose to
mandate consideration of the best interests of the child in custody cases involving
domestic violence due to the historical failure by courts to give such matters due
consideration).
77. See id. § 405 (listing ways in which a court can mitigate the effects of custody
arrangements on domestic violence victims).
78. See Weithorn, supra note 33, at 26.
79. See id. at 36 n.140.
80. See id. at 26-27.
81. See id. at 4.
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and serious difficulties in school."82 Research also shows "that these
children are more likely than are children from nonviolent homes to
develop emotional and adjustment problems as adults, including repetition
of the patterns of violence they observed as children."
Others argue that not all children exposed to domestic violence are
harmed by their exposure.84 In this view, a great deal of government
intervention in family situations is unnecessary." According to this
grouping of research, "a sizable proportion of children exposed to domestic
violence do not appear to be harmed, and thus do not require state
protection through intrusive intervention into the family."8 While it is
clear that many children are in fact harmed by their exposure to violence in
the home, it is still unclear to what extent. The question thus becomes one
of determining which is worse-the exposure to domestic violence or the
removal of children from their parents' care?
The removal of children from their family homes is extremely
detrimental, particularly for children of domestic violence victims.8 7
"Removal of children from an abusive or neglectful home may seem an
appropriate short-term strategy for protecting children."88  Studies show,
however, "that there is a limited likelihood of reunification after removal,
and that risks to children in foster care are substantial."89 Removal may do
more harm than good.90
[R]emoving the child from the non-abusive parent can have an extremely
detrimental effect on the child. Children who have been exposed to
domestic violence often view "their immediate universe as unpredictable
and unsafe" and removal may be more traumatic for them than for other
children. These children are at heightened risk for separation anxiety
disorder and may experience self-blame and anxiety about the safety of
their parent. 91
Children who are removed from their non-abusive parent are placed at
82. Id. at 6.
83. Id.
84. See id. at 27 (arguing that government intervention may extend unnecessarily to
children who are unharmed by exposure to domestic violence).
85. See id at 31.
8 6. Id.
87. See Kathleen A. Copps, The Good, the Bad and the Future of Nicholson v.
Scoppetta: An Analysis of the Effects and Suggestions for Further Improvements, 72
ALB. L. REV. 497, 502 (2009) (arguing that children exposed to domestic violence
suffer more trauma from being separated from family than other children because they
have a higher risk for separation related disorders).
88. Murphy, supra note 40, at 712.
89. Id.
90. See Copps, supra note 87, at 503.
91. Id. at 502.
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risk simply by going into foster care. 9 2 Children in foster care are at a
seventy-five percent higher risk of child maltreatment, twice as likely to die
from abuse, and four times as likely to be sexually abused. 93 Foster care
children
are also more likely to have health problems and receive inadequate
medical care, to have problems in school, and to have behavior and
emotional problems. Children's lives are also further disrupted by
removal because they are separated from their siblings, community,
friends, and school. Also, for practical reasons, visitation may be
difficult and the constraints of supervised visitation may inhibit normal
interaction between parent and child.94
PAST REFORMS
The federal government and states have taken steps to improve the
situation, though many have been ultimately inadequate. The Social
Security Act of 1935 established the Aid to Dependent Children program.
This program increased the federal government's involvement in social
welfare and "established the policy that it is better to provide financial aid
to families in need than to remove children." 5 Subsequently in 1980,
Congress passed the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act. This Act
required judges to determine whether the state has made "reasonable
efforts" both to enable children to remain safely at home before placing
them in foster care, and to reunite foster children with their biological
96parents. However, this "reasonable efforts" standard is a low threshold
and social workers can easily meet it.9 7
In the landmark case of Nicholson v. Scoppetta,98 the New York courts
dealt with the issue of charging battered mothers with neglect, or failing to
protect their children. The decision held that showing that a child was
exposed to domestic violence is insufficient to show neglect. 99
The "more" that is required of the petitioner is a showing, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that (1) the child's physical, mental, or
emotional condition has been impaired or is in imminent danger of
becoming impaired, and (2) the actual or threatened impairment is
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. Id. at 502-03.
95. Id. at 499-500.
96. Murphy, supra note 40, at 705.
97. See Kathleen Bean, Reasonable Efforts: What State Courts Think, 36 U. TOL.
L. REv. 321, 324-27 (2005) (reviewing the history of the application of the "reasonable
efforts" standard from federal legislation by state agencies).
98. 820 N.E.2d 840 (N.Y. 2004).
99. See id. at 844; see also Copps, supra note 87, at 507.
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clearly attributable to the mother's failure to exercise a minimum degree
of care toward the child. The use of the word "imminent" requires that
the harm is "near or impending, not merely possible."
The court also found that there could be no blanket presumption in favor
of removal because not every child is harmed by exposure to domestic
violence and removal may do more harm than good. Each case is fact
specific and the petitioner must provide "particularized evidence" to
prove that removal is in the best interests of the child. 00
The holding also made specific findings regarding reunification: diligent
efforts at reunification, by the Administration for Children's Services
(ACS), must include services to help the parent "so as to render the parent
capable of caring for the child."' 01
These services may include assistance with housing, employment,
counseling, medical care, mental health counseling and psychiatric
treatment.102 This is important because it shows that the New York courts
are aware that providing services to the mother, and thus helping enable her
to provide and care for her children, will ultimately benefit her children as
well. The Nicholson case has also led to increased training of child welfare
workers. "The preliminary injunction in In re Nicholson specifically
required that a training program be implemented that informed all ACS
employees of the requirements of the injunction.,10 3  "One of the most
obvious, but also most important, benefits has been that ACS has been
removing fewer children and charging fewer victims of domestic violence
with neglect solely because of the exposure of their children to domestic
violence." 04
The Greenbook initiative, a national evaluation bom out of the
publication Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence and Child
Maltreatment Cases: Guidelines for Policy and Practice, served as a guide
for how communities could respond to and help families with co-existing
child maltreatment or neglect and domestic violence.' The project
provided a roadmap for ways that child welfare agencies, domestic
violence service providers, and the juvenile courts could work together to
collaborate and effectively respond to families in this situation.106 In 2000,
100. Copps, supra note 87, at 507-08 (citing Nicholson, 820 N.E.2d at 844-47).
101. Id. at 512 (quoting In re Marino S., Jr., 795 N.E.2d 21, 24-25 (N.Y. 2003)).
102. Id. (citing Marino S., Jr., 795 N.E.2d at 25).
103. Id. (quoting In re Nicholson, 181 F. Supp. 2d 182, 192 (E.D.N.Y. 2002)).
104. Id. at 510.
105. Duren Banks et al., Changing Policy and Practice in the Child Welfare System
Through Collaborative Efforts to Identify and Respond Effectively to Family Violence,
23 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 903, 906 (2008).
106. Id.
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six communities with differing needs and population breakdowns (El Paso
County, CO; Grafton County, NH; Lane County, MO; San Francisco
County, CA; St. Louis County, MO; and Santa Clara County, CA) received
funding and other support from the U.S. Department of Justice and U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services to implement the Greenbook
recommendations over the course of a 5-year demonstration initiative.o 7
System change in child welfare agencies was explored in three areas:
"philosophical approach to co-occurrence, screening and assessment, and
case planning and service array for adult victims of domestic violence and
domestic violence perpetrators." 08
The findings of the initiative were varied. Overall, "the sites engaged in
structural changes to facilitate collaboration aimed at improving practices,
services, and outcomes for children and families." Although collaboration
challenges persisted, "collaboration was identified as one of the successes
of the Greenbook initiative."' 09 Through the Greenbook initiative, changes
were made at all levels, including working directly with families with co-
current domestic violence and child maltreatment and neglect. The
different partner organizations contributed to this change in different ways.
The extent and patterns of change varied among sites and systems and was
affected by the larger context of practice.o10 The national evaluation ended
data collection activities in June 2006, but several sites continued
Greenbook work using rollover funds from the original grants."'
SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE REFORMS
While there is no easy solution for court-involved battered mothers, there
are improvements that can be made to existing systems to alleviate
potential confusion that mothers experience and improve their chances for
success (meaning safety and unification with children).112 Better ways
exist to apply the "failure to protect" doctrine and to help battered mothers
107. THE GREENBOOK NAT'L EVALUATION TEAM, THE GREENBOOK INITIATIVE
FINAL EVALUATION REPORT i (2008) [hereinafter GREENBOOK REPORT], available at
http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/08/sr/greenbook/report.pdf.
108. Banks et al., supra note 105, at 911.
109. GREENBOOK REPORT, supra note 107, at iv.
110. Jeffrey L. Edleson & Neena M. Malik, Collaborating for Family Safety:
Results from the Greenbook Multisite Evaluation, 23 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 871,
873 (2008).
111. GREENBOOK REPORT, supra note 107, at 6.
112. See Pualani Enos, Prosecuting Battered Mothers: State Laws' Failure to
Protect Battered Women and Abused Children, 19 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 229, 267-68
(1996) (suggesting the treatment of battered women's interrelated problems through
coordinated action between support systems such as the court, police, CPS and the
medical community).
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and their children stay together." 3  First and foremost, judges, social
workers, and their advocates need to understand why some women stay in
violent homes.1 4 Some victims believe having both parents in the home is
in the child's best interest, particularly if the abuser has not physically
assaulted the children."'5 "Children's pressure on the abused parent can be
quite compelling, especially with those batterers capable of manipulating
the children .... 116 Before removing children from the homes, the court
should first consider removal of the abusive parent or boyfriend rather than
removal of the children." 7
Battered mothers face significant barriers to leaving a violent
situation."' Judges, social workers, and lawyers must fully understand the
hurdles battered mothers caught up in abuse and neglect proceedings face
and the realities in which they mother.119 The majority of parents involved
in child welfare proceedings are indigent.12 0 "[T]he empirical data show
that child abuse (and the child neglect commonly lumped in with it) are
clearly associated with income level."'21 Minority women are in need of
special legal consideration, as women of color are disproportionately
charged with many crimes, including "failure to protect." 2 2 "[I]ndigent
battered women often cannot make use of community resources that are
contingent upon the access afforded by a car, a job with benefits, and
affordable child and healthcare."l 23 Looking at the intersection of domestic
violence and poverty, feminists have long maintained that abuse of women
is one form of social control that has sweeping and long lasting
113. See id. at 229-30 (proposing the replacement of a strict liability test with an
objective test in cases where an abused mother is accused of failing to protect her child
from the abuser).
114. See Sarah M. Buel, Fifty Obstacles to Leaving, a.k.a., Why Abuse Victims Stay,
28 COLO. LAW. 19, 19 (1999) [hereinafter Buel, Fifty Obstacles to Leaving] (explaining
that knowledge of why domestic violence victims stay is essential to stem the tide of
abusive behavior).
115. See id. at 20.
116. Id.
117. See Copps, supra note 87, at 508.
118. See Buel, Fifty Obstacles to Leaving, supra note 114, at 19-26 (describing
several reasons battered women fail to leave their abusers, including financial despair,
isolation, cultural or family pressure, and lack of job skills).
119. See id. at 19-20 (recounting the financial struggles that prompt women to stay
in abusive relationships).
120. Richard J. Gelles, Poverty and Violence Toward Children, 35 AM.
BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 258, 263 (1992); see also Joy Duva & Sania Metzger,
Addressing Poverty as a Major Risk Factor in Child Neglect: Promising Policy and
Practice, 25 AM. HUMANE 63 (2010), available at http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/
conferences/2A-4/ProtectingChildren Article_onPovertyandNeglect.pdf.
121. Gottlieb, supra note 27, at 382.
122. Buel, Effective Assistance of Counsel, supra note 21, at 236.
123. Id. at 242.
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consequences.124
For many domestic violence victims, seeking to escape violence, finding
immediate temporary shelter and more permanent affordable housing must
be identified immediately by counsel or a lay advocate, as these are some
of the main reasons victims return to their abusers.125 "[A]pproximately
one-third of battered women lose their jobs as a direct result of abuse, and
as many as 57.8% do not want to go to work because of threats of future
abuse." 26
Research reveals that experiencing domestic violence increases a
mother's feeling of responsibility in regard to her children.12 7
Consequently, "women have to be resourceful and to develop a range of
strategies in order to protect and care for their children."12 8 The ways in
which women live with violence on a consistent basis and make decisions
to protect their children from that violence defies the notion that battered
mothers are defective parents.12 9  "Domestic violence creates an
environment deeply un-conducive to achieving even 'good enough'
mothering. That so many women do resolve this impossible conundrum is
testimony to their spirit, endurance and determination."o30 Thus, it matters
that so many battered mothers can parent and keep their children safe.
Courts can aid or hinder that responsibility.
Women who are unable to stop the violence or leave their abusive
partners risk losing their children to the foster care system.131 The practice
of removing children from domestic violence victims has "been criticized
for not taking into account the difficulties and threats women face when
they go through domestic violence and when they attempt to leave their
partners, and the intervention strategies therefore tend to be experienced as
punitive and blaming rather than as supportive." 32 In addition, the practice
of removing children from victims shifts the focus from men to women.
"[T]he problem becomes defined in terms of women's 'failures' as mothers
rather than in terms of the father's actions." 33 Judges, social workers and
lawyers must internalize this notion and evaluate and advocate on behalf of
battered mothers in their unique context.
124. Id. at 243.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 242-44.
127. Lapierre, supra note 18, at 1442.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1436.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1437.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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Equally if not more important is the potential for danger in leaving;
women who leave their batterers are often at heightened risk of harm. 13 4
This escalation of violence at the time of separation has been coined
"separation assault."13 5 "Offering victims of domestic violence the remedy
of seeking an order of protection further assumes that getting an order will
make them safe-or at least, safer."136  Research shows that a battered
woman is 75 percent more likely to be murdered when she tries to escape
or has escaped, than when she stays.13 7 It is, therefore, dangerous for
counsel, social workers, or the court to simply advise, or worse, to require,
a victim to simply leave without ensuring that a trained advocate or
attorney has worked with her to conduct extensive safety planning.138
Battered women know their situations, their batterers, and those events
and decisions that incite violence with their batterers. Leaving and
obtaining a protective order are two actions that can, and often do, put a
victim of violence in even more danger.139 Requiring immediate separation
and procurement of a protective order is potentially shortsighted and
dangerous.
To think that men who are found to have physically, sexually, and/or
psychologically abused their intimate partners (such a finding generally
being the basis for the issuance of an order of protection in the first
instance) will just "cease and desist" if ordered to do so by a court is
simply unrealistic.140
Judges and social workers need to understand the multiple factors at play
that prevent a battered mother from leaving a battering relationship. The
evaluation must then be based on the battered mother's parenting in the
particularized context of her situation. "That abuse victims make many
courageous efforts to flee the violence is too often overlooked in the
process of judging them for now being with the batterer."l41
Lawyers and scholars must recognize the continuum of agency and
victim-hood; doing noting or taking sufficient steps to protect oneself are
not two discrete categories into which battered women can be
134. Aiken & Goldwasser, supra note 51, at 162.
135. See Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the
Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1, 6 (1991) (coining the term "separation
assault" to identify assaults that block women from leaving).
136. Id.
137. Buel, Fifty Obstacles to Leaving, supra note 114, at 19.
138. See id. (asserting the need for safety planning to avoid separation assault).
139. See id (noting the higher probability that a woman will be killed by her abuser
if she tries to or does flee); Aiken & Goldwasser, supra note 51, at 153 n.87 (citing a
study showing that protective orders give women a false sense of security, thereby
increasing their danger).
140. Aiken & Goldwasser, supra note 51, at 152.
141. Buel, Fifty Obstacles to Leaving, supra note 114, at 19.
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classified .... A victim's ability to engage in help-seeking behavior is
constrained by myriad factors, many of which are beyond her control.142
Social workers who may have had minimal specialized training in
domestic violence make most of the decisions regarding initial removal. 14 3
"These workers make largely discretionary judgments about bad mothering
and their underlying assumptions are, for the most part, unexamined and
unchallenged. Conversations with workers reveal a deep bias about bad
mothering based on race, class, and poverty."'"
Social workers and the courts often place unrealistic and reactionary
expectations on women to either obtain a protective order or immediately
separate. Not only are both expectations potentially impossible for women
who are financially dependent on their abuser and may have little
community support system-which is common after a relationship built on
control and potential isolation-but they are dangerous and could have
lasting, counterintuitive results. Social workers need more training and
support in dealing with cases involving domestic violence.
Such training is critical both for making the right choices in these
challenging cases and for noticing the domestic violence in the first place,
because domestic violence often goes unnoticed by child welfare
professionals. Research suggests that social workers are missing the mark
with this population. "Using data from a nationally representative sample
of families investigated for child maltreatment ... found that 31% of
female caregivers reported that they experienced domestic violence in the
preceding year but that child welfare workers identified this violence in
only 12% of all families who were investigated." 4 5
"Failure to protect" cases filed against battered mothers should have
more than one social worker appointed to the case, to mandate that a
battered mother receive supportive services, multiple opinions and diverse
option creation from social workers to help a mother find safety. And, if
removal is suggested, a domestic violence team from the state's child
welfare agency should be appointed and a detailed plan for reunification
must be drafted. Battered mothers must have a safe place to go, an
effective way to communicate with their social workers, and frequent visits
with their children if there is in fact temporary removal.
In addition, thwarting statutory expansion of child protection's reach in
cases involving domestic violence may improve victim's help-seeking
behaviors. Domestic violence advocates fear that such expansion of the
reach of child protective services will further inhibit battered women from
142. Buel, Effective Assistance of Counsel, supra note 21, at 224-25.
143. Murphy, supra note 40, at 706-07.
144. Id. at 707.
145. Banks et al., supra note 105, at 905.
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seeking help. For example, if workers at domestic violence shelters
become mandated reporters of child maltreatment under state reporting
statutes, battered women may become less willing to seek their help.146 In
some states, workers at domestic violence shelters are already mandated
reporters.14 7  The threat of an abuse and neglect report may dissuade
battered mothers from taking the positive steps of reporting abuse by
abusive partners, seeking medical care, or pursuing protection orders. 148
Battered mothers must also be appointed counsel with expertise in the
dynamics of domestic violence. In venues such as abuse and neglect
proceedings, where mothers receive appointed counsel if their income
qualifies, those attorneys should understand the complexity of battering
relationships and understand the interrelation between the systems.
Further, these lawyers should be required to investigate whether their
clients are or have been involved in other court systems, what happened in
those cases, and whether their client is aware of what is happening. "That
so many battered women defendants receive ineffective legal assistance
ought to compel introspection and remedial action within the legal
profession." 4 9
The implications for battered defendants of incompetent representation
are disastrous." 0
The problem is characterized by attorneys' failure to present defense
theories linked to the abuse endured by battered women defendants and
is further compounded by judges who refuse to apply the law. A
battered woman defendant's case outcome is not so much predicated on
the specific facts of her situation as on whom she draws for judge and
counsel, as well as her race and socioeconomic status.15 1
Traditional theories of representation and the lawyer-client relationship
do not apply to battered mothers.152 A battered defendant may have a hard
time talking about the level of abuse (physical and psychological) they
have endured over the course of her relationship. Counsel, therefore, has
an obligation to provide a safe counseling and interviewing space and to
146. Weithorn, supra note 33, at 26-27.
147. See, e.g., ARIZ. COAL. AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, CONFIDENTIALITY FOR
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SERVICE PROVIDERS IN ARIZONA UNDER FEDERAL AND STATE
LAW 18 (2003), http://www.delapointe.net/diannepost/docs/confidentiality manual.pdf
(noting that any domestic violence victim advocate who comes to reasonably believe,
during the course of her employment, that a child is a victim of abuse must
immediately report this information to a peace officer or Child Protective Services).
148. Murphy, supra note 40, at 722.
149. Buel, Effective Assistance of Counsel, supra note 21, at 217-18.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See id at 226.
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sensitively question her client about the extent and history of abuse. 53
"A battered defendant[,] who has often been denied even the right to
speak by the abuser, needs her lawyer to accurately present her voice in
court."l 54 Figuring out a battered client's voice is not an easy job. Lawyers
who do not have training in domestic violence or who are unable to show
empathy may not be providing competent representation.' 55 In fact, some
argue that many prosecutors are more open to just case dispositions when
the attorney has prepared an extensive review of the history of facts and
violence and any mitigating circumstances surrounding the domestic
violence victims' commission of an offense.156
Lawyers and judges must be able to understand that there are more than
two options when it comes to battered mothers: staying and leaving. s5
"[D]oing nothing or taking sufficient steps to protect oneself are not two
discrete categories into which battered women can be classified . . . . A
victim's ability to engage in help-seeking behavior is constrained by
myriad factors, many of which are beyond her control."5 s
The short term costs of appointing more experienced counsel and
educating judges about the complex dynamics of domestic violence are far
less expensive than what the current system pays out. "The short term
costs of this method are far greater than providing the needed services
(foster care can cost upward of $19,000 per child per year) and the long
term costs are even worse." 159 The high cost of foster care, coupled with
poor outcomes for youth in placement such as higher rates of
homelessness, criminal behavior, and poverty than those children who
remained with their parents, supports this notion.
More broadly, society and the systems that exist therein must make it
easier for battered women to safely leave their abusive partners. Thus,
when the legal system does intervene, the actors will not ignore the
fundamental bond that exists between mothers and their children, but will
be able to provide real, safe options as opposed to removal.16 0 In other
words, the conversation must go beyond the divide of mothers' rights vs.
children's rights, and see that one does not exist without the other.16 1
Several questions regarding the exchange of information remain when
153. Id. at 220.
154. Id. at 226.
155. Id. at 227.
156. Id. at 221.
157. See id. at 224-25.
158. Id.
159. Gottlieb, supra note 27, at 379.
160. See Murphy, supra note 40, at 762.
161. Id.
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advancing the argument for systemic change. Is there a way to share
information among the different court systems without violating a battered
mother's confidentiality? Is there a way for cases to be "flagged" in a state
system, so that when a child welfare case based on "failure to protect,"
based on exposure to domestic violence, is closed because of a mother's
compliance and a father subsequently files a custody case in family court,
that judge in the family court case is made aware of what could be a
strategic move by a batterer?
In most jurisdictions in the United States, juvenile court records are
closed to the public. To receive federal ftmding under the Child Abuse
Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA), among other requirements, states
must preserve the confidentiality of all child abuse and neglect reports,
except in limited circumstances. 162  Furthermore, all states have
confidentiality provisions to protect abuse and neglect records from public
scrutiny. Confidentiality provisions mandate that such records are
confidential, and many include specific mechanisms for protecting them
from public view.
There are, however, "damaging consequences of confidentiality laws."163
Confidentiality laws frustrate easy communication between courts. Laws
that prohibit public conversation of child welfare cases silence many
powerful stories. The media and the public do not have open access to
what actually happens to children and their parents in the child welfare and
family court system.164
Confidentiality laws prevent the procurement of statistics on how many
battered mothers in every state in the United States are charged with
"failure to protect." This data would be useful to compare and contrast
with data available from family courts on how many of those same named
parties-i.e. fathers-filed for custody in the family court once the child
welfare case concluded. Further, family court judges would be given
access to those juvenile court files that inevitably would provide a deeper
history on the parties and parenting practices than a brief family court
hearing.
Sharing information and allowing the public to see what is happening in
the different court systems is an important first step to repair the current
state of affairs. The current approach to domestic violence is focused on
empowering individual victims by encouraging them to seek legal
remedies.'6 5 This approach fails when the victims are multi-court involved
162. See 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(B)(viii)-(x) (2006).
163. Matthew I. Fraidin, Stories Told and Untold: Confidentiality and the Master
Narrative of Child Welfare, 63 ME. L. REv. 1, 2 (2010).
164. Id. at 3.
165. Aiken & Goldwasser, supra note 51, at 180.
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mothers. For these women, domestic violence is more than an individual
problem. Rather, it is a family problem and a community problem.
Careful sharing of information between courts and with the public will help
transform the court's approach to domestic violence from one that is
limited and focused on individuals to one that is broader and more holistic.
Forcing the system actors to take responsibility and provide real options
for battered mothers and allowing the public to access, opine, and advocate
on behalf of this group that is currently silenced by confidentiality laws
will help battered mothers in their fight for safety and fair access and
intervention by the juvenile court, family court, and civil court in this
country.
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